Most of Plato's Timaeus consists of the titular figure's account of the generation and structure of the material world and the eternal model upon which it is based-a massive undertaking in sixty-five pages, as Richard Mohr notes (Mohr and Sattler 2010.1). In addition to its value as a philosophical treatise, I contend that Timaeus's narrative as a whole functions as a meditative model for his fellow feast-friends and for the audience at large. He explains how humans may "reduce to settled order the wandering motions in ourselves" (47c4-5)
own instructions, his account functions as a model for readers, who are meant to internalize and imitate the meditative process.
THE FIGURATIVE SHAPE OF TIMAEUS'S ACCOUNT
I situate my argument among those that view the structure of Timaeus's account as a figurative representation of its contents. Svetla SlavevaGriffin suggests that, for those who interpret the myth of the Demiurge as a literary enterprise rather than a literal description of the creation of the universe, "the philosophical content cannot be separated from the literary form, and the literary form cannot be understood fully without the philosophical content" (2005.312) . It is possible to interpret Timaeus's account as both literal and figurative; for the purposes of my argument, I assume that it must be, in part, figurative. Slaveva-Griffin argues that Socrates' request for a "feast of speeches" (τὴν τῶν λόγων ἑστίασιν, 27b7-8) early in the dialogue plays both a literary and philosophical role, since, for him, speeches are images that create further images (2005.317) . Therefore, Socrates' request for a feast of speeches in fact "asks specifically for an account of the Demiurge's creation" (2005.312 ). Necessarily, then, there exists a relationship between Timaeus's account-and the images it both contains and inspires-and the universe whose generation and structure he describes.
Rémi Brague also believes the organization of Timaeus's narrative is a figurative representation of its contents, but he suggests that Timaeus's narrative structure imitates that of the human body or, more precisely, "of the whole made up by the head and the trunk" (1985.61) . He posits that Timaeus's speech contains two distinct parts: the first concerns Reason, which Brague likens to the human head, the very seat of reason, and the second concerns Necessity, which he likens to the trunk, and which contains the internal organs such as the stomach. The articulation of these two parts occurs in the dialogue at 47e, which corresponds, in Brague's view, to the articulation between the head and the rest of the body. He maintains that, although there does appear to be a third part to the speech, there is an "essential difference" between the first narrative articulation in 47e and the second articulation in 69a, namely, "The former does nothing more than return to a starting point given previously . . . whereas the latter introduces something entirely new " (1985.61) . Although I disagree with Brague's interpretation of a dipartite, rather than tripartite, narrative, I appreciate his likening of the narrative structure to the figure of the human body, as this is the kind of creative interpretation that is warranted by Timaeus's account. Most importantly, Brague's argument illustrates how examining the narrative structure of that account illuminates its philosophical content and purpose.
Finally, Catherine Osborne acknowledges that there is a "parallel between the shape of Timaeus's discourse in Plato's dialogue and the shape of the world that he describes," and that his task of "describing a world in words" is analogous to the task of the Demiurge, who must create a world out of matter (1996.179). She notes that Timaeus's account shapes "in words a likeness of the perfect and eternal reality," because it is impossible for Timaeus, as a mortal being who exists in the realm of Becoming, to illustrate the intangible eternal model tangibly for his audience (1996.179). However, he makes a concerted effort to illustrate the realm of Being via his eikos logos or eikos muthos-"likely account" will suffice for the time being-which is a likeness or image of the eternal model.
Osborne suggests three different possibilities for the structure of Timaeus's discourse and the "shape" it figuratively represents. One possibility, she explains, is a "circle which returns each time to the same point," but she discounts this theory, as do I, because she does not believe Timaeus "would suggest that we had taken the same route in investigating necessity and the divine" in the three sections of the monologue (1996.198 ; emphasis in orig.). The second possibility she offers is a rectilinear shape-perhaps a triangle, she suggests-"in which a number of different paths can be taken from the same starting-point and eventually meet to complete the figure" (1996.198) . While triangular shapes are significant in Timaeus's conception of the material world-they compose the faces of the bodies (somata) that make up four of the five elements (53c4-8) 2 -it is the eternal rather than the material world that Timaeus ultimately encourages his audience to contemplate. Knowledge of the material world is valuable insofar as one meditates upon it to comprehend the eternal model. Furthermore, Timaeus insists repeatedly that his account is an eikos logos, but he need not offer an eikos logos of what is visible and sensible, for the material world is itself sensible. We must pursue why he does not consider his account simply a logos. Triangles will not offer us the answer.
It is the third possibility Osborne mentions that I shall explore further: that the figurative shape of Timaeus's monologue is modeled after "a number of circular orbits intersecting at a point but tracing a different path on a sphere," and this model "corresponds in spatial structure to the arrangement of the circles of the Same and the Different out of which the demiurge constructs the world-soul" (1996.198) . I concur that the three sections of Timaeus's account represent figuratively three paths around a sphere that end and begin at the same point, corresponding in structure to the circles of the Same and Different. As the human analogue to the Demiurge (see Martijn 2010.280ff.) , Timaeus depicts the shape of the universe figuratively by means of the eikos logos he generates. Further, this figurative structure serves a didactic purpose: Timaeus instructs his audience members to meditate upon the intangible circles of the Same and Different, and they learn to do so by meditating on the contents and figurative shapes of the narrative itself.
LIKELY LIKENESSES: EIKOS LOGOS AND EIKOS MUTHOS
I return to the phrase eikos logos, which appears thirteen times in the dialogue, and the related phrase eikos muthos, which appears three times (Morgan 2000.272) .
3 Though "likely account" is an accurate and acceptable translation of eikos logos, I suggest that translating eikos logos as "likeness" is also correct, and this translation makes explicit the relationship between the figurative shape of the narrative and its subject. If, as SlavevaGriffin proposes, we approach the concept of logoi as Socrates does, as images that produce more images, then Timaeus's speech is an image, or likeness, that produces more likenesses. Before he begins his account in earnest, Timaeus himself explains that "our world must necessarily be a likeness (eikona) of something" (29b1-2), and, since "an account of what is made in the image of that other, but is [itself] only a likeness (eikonos), will itself be but likely (eikotas)" (29c1-2), it is not a conceptual stretch to render eikos logos as "likeness." The account is likely because it is but a likeness (the eikos logos) of a likeness (the material world) of the eternal model. As F. M. Cornford states, Timaeus's account is likely insofar as "no account of the material world can ever amount to an exact and selfconsistent statement of unchangeable truth " (1937.31) .
The phrase eikos muthos appears only three times in the dialogue (29d2, 59c6, 68d2) and presents slightly different conceptual and translational challenges than does the phrase eikos logos. 4 As he begins his narrative, Timaeus qualifies his account in the following way (29c4-d3):
If then, Socrates, in many respects concerning many things-the gods and the generation of the universe-we prove unable to render an account at all points entirely consistent with itself and exact, you must not be surprised. If we can furnish accounts no less likely (eikotas) than any other, we must be content, remembering that I who speak and you my judges are only human, and consequently it is fitting that we should, in these matters, accept the likely story (eikota muthon) and look for nothing further.
Cornford translates eikos muthos above as "likely story" and maintains that the Timaeus is a muthos in part because "the cosmology is cast in the form of a cosmogony, a 'story' of events spread out in time" (1937.31) . However, according to M. F. Burnyeat, to translate eikos muthos as "probable story" or "likely tale" is "at best misleading, [and] at worst an utter distortion of Plato's intent" (2009.167) . Burnyeat argues that muthos ought to be translated as "myth" because Timaeus's account of the universe "is nothing less than a theogony": since the kosmos is a god, then the story of the birth of the kosmos is that of the birth of a god (2009.168). Moreover, he argues, the use of the phrase eikos logos does not indicate that muthos is equivalent to logos, but rather that "an eikōs muthos is a logos as well as a myth" (2009.169, original emphasis).
5 A. E. Taylor splits the difference, and interprets Timaeus's account as "not 'science' but 'myth,' not in the sense that it is baseless fiction, but in the sense that it is the nearest approximation which can 'provisionally' be made to exact truth" (1928.59). According to this logic, perhaps the eikos in eikos muthos is redundant, because a myth is, at best, likely rather than wholly truthful. According to Kathryn Morgan, Plato uses the word muthos to refer to "philosophically-driven cosmological speculation," which leads to the conclusion that perhaps "all philosophical accounts are in some sense mythoi" (2000.271). The interlocutors in the frame narrative of the Timaeus offer a metanarrative that comments on not only the reception of stories about the past, but also on "the provisionality of language" itself (2000.261). Although these muthoi are provisional, Morgan argues that they are not dangerous, since Timaeus offers them in an openly "self-qualifying way" and before "an audience of mature intellectuals" (2000.261). Indeed, Timaeus's repeated acknowledgement that his account is likely reminds the audience, within and outside of the text, to be wary of even a philosopher's ability to present information about the realm of Being.
Much has been made of the myth of Atlantis in the prologue of the Timaeus and how its truth value may alter one's interpretation of the phrase eikos muthos. In the frame narrative, Critias describes how Solon traveled to Egypt and learned of the war between Athens and Atlantis. Osborne suggests that Plato contrasts two distinct types of discourse in the Timaeus: Critias's account of the Atlantis myth in the introductory portion of the dialogue "seeks to picture faithfully something from the past," while Timaeus's account of the generation of the world "seeks to bring a living model into being here and now" (1996.184). In contrast, Thomas Johansen maintains that the Atlantis story "should be seen as 'history' only in a special Platonic sense: it is a story which is fabricated about the past in order to reflect a general truth about how ideal citizens would fare in war" (2004.24) . Whether one interprets the Atlantis story as myth or history does not change the fact that Critias seeks to create images when he offers his account, regardless of whether those images are meant to reflect reality or a general truth. Thus the eikos in eikos muthos is subsumed by the concept of muthos itself: it is equally correct to render eikos muthos as "likely tale" or, simply, as "tale." The complications are embedded in one's interpretation of muthos as an accurate retelling of past events, as a mythological story meant to reflect a general truth, or as a hybrid of both history and myth. The intricacies of these complications are outside the scope of the present argument; however, it is clear that Timaeus, a human being who exists in the material world of Becoming, cannot precisely describe the kosmos, which exists in the realm of Being, and must instead offer an eikos logos to illustrate and model the universe.
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THREE NARRATIVE CIRCLES
The tripartite nature of Timaeus's account is foreshadowed by an emphasis on the number three in the frame narrative.
7 The dialogue begins with Socrates, who, counting off Timaeus, Hermocrates, and Critias, asks: "One, two, three-but where, my dear Timaeus, is the fourth of those guests of yesterday who were to entertain me today?" (17a1-3). Timaeus explains that the fourth guest is unwell and for no other reason would miss the gathering. As John Sallis notes, this "counting, one, two, three, will be repeated many times in the course of the Timaeus, and each time it will be imperative to circumscribe precisely what is being counted" (1999.8). Indeed, such counting is repeated when Critias introduces the order of the speeches (27a2-b1):
Then I will submit to you the plan we have arranged for your entertainment, Socrates. We decided that Timaeus shall speak first. He knows more of astronomy than the rest of us and has made knowledge of the nature of the universe his chief object; he will begin with the birth of the world and end with the nature of man. Then I am to follow, taking over from him mankind, whose origin he has described, and from you a portion of them who have received a supremely good training.
Presumably, the Timaeus was the first dialogue of what originally was to be a trilogy, containing the Timaeus, Critias, and, most likely, the Hermocrates, or possibly a tetralogy, if we include the Republic, to which speakers in the frame narrative obliquely refer. However, Plato only composed part of the Critias-it ends midsentence-and the Hermocrates was never written (Cornford 1937.1) .
8 I will return below to the significance of the absent fourth guest and the potential fourth dialogue. For the moment, we may examine the three narrative sections we have in Timaeus's account.
The First Narrative Circle
Critias explains that Timaeus will speak first because he is the best astronomer and will begin from the birth of the kosmos and will end with the nature of humankind.
9 After an invocation and Socrates' approval, Timaeus offers a prelude to his narrative. He makes a distinction between the realms of Being and Becoming: things that are in the realm of Being (ousia) are eternal and intelligible, and those that are in the realm of Becoming have a genesis and are sensible. Since the world is sensible, it must have had a genesis and, therefore, a maker. According to Timaeus, the craftsman of the world, whom he calls the Demiurge, employed an eternal model when creating the world, since the world is good and so is its craftsman. As Cornford explains, the "chief point established in this prelude is that the visible world, of which an account is to be given, is a changing image or likeness (eikon) of the eternal model" (1937.23). The first section of Timaeus's narrative, what I term the first narrative circle, primarily focuses on the works of Reason, which are the elements of the realms of Being and Becoming that "most clearly manifest an intelligent and intelligible design" (Cornford 1937.32) .
It is emphasized repeatedly in the Timaeus that the learning process involves both verbal instruction and physical imitation. According to Timaeus, the kosmos is a living animal bestowed with soul, and this World-Soul revolves in two circles, that of the Same (auton) and that of the Different or Other (thateron). The Demiurge composed the World-Soul of the Same, the Different, and a third kind, Being, a mixture of the two, with which he imbued the living kosmos. He mixed a less pure form of the World-Soul from its residue (τὰ τῶν πρόσθεν ὑπόλοιπα, 41d5-6) and distributed it among the stars. The Demiurge then created lesser gods, whose responsibility it was to create all other living creatures. After their creation, he addresses them as follows (41b6-c6):
Now, therefore, take heed (mathete) to this that I declare (endeiknumenos) to you. There are yet left mortal creatures of three kinds that have not been brought into being. If these be not born, the Heaven will be imperfect; for it will not contain all the kinds of living being, as it must if it is to be perfect and complete. But if I myself gave them birth and life, they would be equal to gods. In order, then, that mortal things may exist and this All may be truly all, turn according to your own nature to the making (demiourgian) of living creatures, imitating (mimoumenoi) my power in generating you.
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The Demiurge orders the lesser gods to take heed of both that which he tells them and that which he has revealed to them by means of his actions, and they may only learn to generate mortal beings if they perform both tasks. Once the Demiurge finishes his speech, the gods heed "their father's ordinance and set about obeying it" because they "received the immortal principle of a mortal creature, imitating (mimoumenoi) their own maker" (42e7-8).
As for mortal beings, Timaeus explains that they begin their lives with their own soul-circles in a state of volatility.
11 Unlike the World-Soul, which, when joined with the kosmos, was not assailed by any external forces that disrupted its circular motion, the human soul moves haphazardly when first joined with a body because of external sensations. As a human being matures, "the revolutions are corrected (kateuthunomenai) to the form that belongs to the several circles in their natural motion; and giving their right names to what is different and to what is the same, they set their possessor in the way to become rational (emphrona)" (44b5-7). However, intelligence is not a direct consequence of human existence:
Timaeus stipulates that, "if some right nurture (trophe) lends help towards education (paideuseos), he becomes entirely whole and unblemished, having escaped the worst of maladies; whereas if he be neglectful, he journeys through a life halt and maimed and comes back to Hades uninitiate (ateles) and without understanding (anoetos)" (44b8-c4). Therefore, one does not necessarily become emphron with age; the process of becoming an intelligent and well-regulated person also involves the appropriate education. Intelligence is the synergistic product of both education and action.
Timaeus then describes how the lesser gods go about designing the human body. They create a round head to house the soul, the shape of which mimics the spherical shape of the universe, and it rules over the rest of the body; limbs and a trunk are created to propel the head forward. He explains that there are secondary reasons (sunaitia) for physical traits and abilities such as sight and hearing, reasons which will be discussed in the second part of the account. However, the ultimate cause (aitia) of vision, the first ability he explores, is so that mortals can ponder the revolution of the planets, thereby meditating upon the World-Soul and learning to imitate its revolutions (47b5-c4): 12 For our part, rather let us speak of eyesight as the cause of this benefit [philosophy], for these ends: the god invented and gave us vision in order that we might observe the circuits of intelligence (tou nou) in the heaven and profit by them for the revolutions of our own thought, which are akin to them, though ours be troubled and they are unperturbed; and that, by learning (ekmathontes) to know them and acquiring the power to compute them rightly according to nature, we might reproduce (mimoumenoi) the perfectly unerring (aplaneis) revolutions of the god and reduce to settled order the wandering (peplanemenas) motions in ourselves. 13 12 For a comprehensive examination of aitia and sunaitia, see Broadie 2012 , in particular chapter 6, "The Genesis of the Four Elements." 13 Wandering is introduced as a negative quality in the frame narrative by Socrates, who explains: "The sophists, again, I have always thought, have had plenty of practice making fine speeches on other subjects of all sorts; but with their habit of wandering (planeton) from city to city and having no settled home of their own, I am afraid they would hardly hit upon what men who are both philosophers and statesmen would do and say in times of war, in the conduct of actual fighting, or of negotiation" (19e2-9).
Just as the lesser gods may only learn to create mortal beings if they listen to the instructions of the Demiurge and imitate his actions, so, too, may we humans only settle our souls if we meditate upon the soulcircles of the universe and imitate their revolutions. Vision allows humans to study the planets' movements, and, as A. E. Taylor explains, this knowledge encourages humans "to take up the task of bringing the disordered and 'surd' revolutions of the circles in our own souls into a corresponding order" (1928.295) . Timaeus himself employs the same methods of instruction as the Demiurge when instructing Socrates, Hermocrates, and Critias: Timaeus's explanation is not successful without a demonstration, the account itself, which illuminates and validates the education. However, unlike the Demiurge, Timaeus does not order his companions to live in a particular fashion; rather, it is up to the audience members, both those interacting directly with Timaeus and those reading the text, to interpret the didactic nature of his account and the meditative process its tripartite structure represents.
Note that the instructions offered by the Demiurge to the lesser gods, quoted above, appear near the end of the first narrative circle. It is the first time we hear the voice of the Demiurge, and his extensive commands appear in direct speech. As a human, Timaeus can only communicate the orders and works of the Demiurge by means of language. The first narrative circle, in which Timaeus describes material reality in its most macroscopic terms, is only one possible expression of his eikos logos. At the end of this section, Timaeus suggests that his "foregoing discourse, save for a few matters, has set forth the works wrought by the craftsmanship of Reason (dia nou)," but that he "must now set beside them the things that come about of Necessity (di' anankes)" (47e3-5). Timaeus has fulfilled the task Critias said he would perform: Timaeus began his account with the birth of the kosmos and ended with the nature of humankind. At the end of the first narrative circle, he returns once more to the same point where he began his dialogue: the generation of the kosmos.
The Second Narrative Circle
The second narrative circle begins (48a5-b3):
If, then, we are really to tell how it [to pan, the universe] came into being on this principle [that the generation of the universe was caused by both Reason and Necessity], we must bring in also the Errant Cause (planomenes . . . aitias)-in what manner its nature is to cause motion. So we must return upon our steps thus, and taking, in its turn, a second principle (heteran archen) concerned in the origin of these same things, start once more (authis au) upon our present theme from the beginning (ap' arches), as we did upon the theme of our earlier discourse.
The words authis au indicate that Timaeus offers a new beginning of the same account rather than the beginning of an entirely new account. Let us imagine a series of circular paths around a sphere. The first section of Timaeus's account figuratively represents one completed path around the sphere, and the above passage indicates that the point at which the first account begins and ends is where the second account begins. Though the circles do not follow the exact same path-the accounts offered are different, after all, just as the circles of the Same and Different track different paths around the sphere of the kosmos-the accounts refer to the same objects or "these same things" (αὐτῶν τούτων, 48b1).
The second narrative circle concerns those things that have come about due to Necessity (anankes). By Timaeus's own admission, the first two sections of his account are linked, and he comments (48e2-49a4): "Our new starting-point in describing the universe must, however, be a fuller classification than we made before. We then distinguished two things; but now a third must be pointed out. For our earlier discourse the two were sufficient . . . A third we did not then distinguish, thinking that the two would suffice; but now, it seems, the argument compels us to attempt to bring to light and describe a form difficult and obscure." Unlike the first narrative circle, which only introduced two kinds, Being and Becoming, we now learn of a third kind, the Receptacle or Chora.
14 However, as with his first narrative circle, here, too, Timaeus begins with the generation of the kosmos. He introduces the Chora, which had been absent from the previous discussion, and describes how, "even before Heaven came into being" (52d4), there existed Being, Chora, and Becoming (ὄν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ γένεσιν, 52d3). In the course of this section, we learn of the material elements earth, air, fire, and water, how they interact with one another, and their composition out of triangles. The second narrative circle ends with a discussion of the sensations each of the elements inspires in humans, including the elements' tactile natures and weights, whether they inspire pleasure or pain, and their tastes, smells, sounds, and colors. Thus Timaeus ends the second section of his account as Critias anticipated and just as Timaeus ended the first: with the nature of humankind. This section, like the first, also figuratively represents a single circular path around a sphere that begins and ends at the same conceptual point and in which Timaeus explores another facet of material reality, this time on a more microscopic level.
The Third Narrative Circle
The third and final narrative circle begins at 69a6. For the sake of clarity, I reproduce the Greek (69a6-b1):
Ὅτ᾿ οὖν δὴ τὰ νῦν οἷα τέκτοσιν ἡμῖν ὕλη παράκειται τὰ τῶν αἰτίων γένη διυλισμένα, ἐξ ὧν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον λόγον δεῖ συνυφανθῆναι, πάλιν ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὴν ἐπανέλθωμεν διὰ βραχέων, ταχύ τε εἰς ταὐτὸν πορευθῶμεν ὅθεν δεῦρο ἀφικόμεθα, καὶ τελευτὴν ἤδη κεφαλήν τε τῷ μύθῳ πειρώμεθα ἁρμόττουσαν ἐπιθεῖναι τοῖς πρόσθεν. Now that the materials for our building lie ready sorted to our hand, namely the kinds of cause we have distinguished, which are to be combined in the fabric of our remaining discourse, let us in brief return to our starting-point and rapidly trace the steps that led us to the point from which we have now reached the same position once more; and then attempt to crown our story with a completion fitting all that has gone before.
Timaeus wishes: "Quickly let us be carried to the same point whence we arrived here" (ταχύ τε εἰς ταὐτὸν πορευθῶμεν ὅθεν δεῦρο ἀφικόμεθα, my translation). The "same point" (tauton) and "here" (deuro) are, in fact, the very same place. At 69a, Timaeus has just passed through the starting point of his third narrative circle that is also the beginning and endpoint of his first and second narrative circles. The three sections of Timaeus's narrative are connected: the first section concerns the works of Reason, the second the works of Necessity, and the final section illustrates the relationship between Reason and Necessity. Though Cornford believes tauton refers to sensation and sense perception (1937.280) , I argue that tau ton actually refers to that beginning of Timaeus's account to which Critias refers at the start of the dialogue: the birth of the kosmos. Indeed, Timaeus offers a brief synopsis of the path his first two narrative circles have taken: the Demiurge imposes order upon the elements and creates around them "this universe, a single living creature containing within itself all living creatures, mortal and immortal" (69b8-c3). The Demiurge then bestows upon his children the task of generating mortal beings, and they create the shape of the body that each human shall inhabit.
The final narrative circle primarily concerns the composition of human beings and how each part is constructed to fulfill the requirements of Reason by means of what is required by Necessity. We learn how the body is a vehicle for the soul: as stated in the second narrative section, the divine part of the soul resides in the head, while the mortal part of the soul resides in the trunk. This arrangement allows the spirited part of the soul to hear the commands of the reasonable part to keep one's desires in check. Timaeus then describes the human body and its functions in detail and emphasizes the connection between the human body and the universe. Each body is its own mortal kosmos unto itself, and, like the eternal kos mos, the best motion for a human body is "that motion which is produced in oneself by oneself, since it is most akin to the movement of thought and the universe" (89a1-3). In correcting one's soul-circles by "learning to know the harmonies and revolutions of the world," humans are able to "bring the intelligent part . . . into the likeness of that which intelligence discerns, and thereby win the fulfillment of the best life set by the gods before mankind" (90d1-6).
Just as with the first two narrative circles, this third circle ends with the nature of human beings. Timaeus says that he has "fairly accomplished the task laid upon us at the outset: to tell the story of the universe so far as to the generation of man" (90e1-3). In his epilogue, he describes the generation of lesser creatures-women, and then animals of the sky, land, and sea-but this takes place after the completion of his original task that required the kosmos to have "received in full its complement of living creatures, mortal and immortal," so that this world thus became "a visible living creature embracing all that are visible and an image of the intelligible, a perceptible god, supreme in greatness and excellence, in beauty and perfection, this Heaven single in its kind" (92c5-9). Although Critias originally said that the narrative would end with an explanation of the nature of humankind, Timaeus actually concludes with a depiction of the heavens that embrace all creatures, and the mortal creatures that had, in his eikos logos, yet to be generated; therefore, he simultaneously completes the third narrative circle and begins anew with the generation of the kosmos.
THE FOURTH GUEST
Timaeus is a decidedly human narrator who repeatedly emphasizes the process of aligning one's own soul-circles with those of the kosmos in order to settle one's emotional turmoil. This approach calls attention to the value and intention of Plato's written account and emphasizes the function of its multiple narrative beginnings. 15 As a human being, Timaeus comprehends the universe by means of logoi, and he is only able to communicate the shape of the eternal model insofar as language can represent it; consequently, Timaeus performs the meditative process he highlights by means of his own eikos logos. Therefore, it is not only the information that he communicates that makes his account significant; of equal importance is his method. Audience members within and outside of the text must be attuned to this meditative process so that we may recognize it and imitate it. To overlook the tripartite nature of Timaeus's account is to overlook the purpose of his account as a whole. This, to my mind, must be part of the reason Cornford suggests that, in the Timaeus, "there remains an irreducible element of poetry, which refuses to be translated into the language of scientific prose" (1937.32).
We may still ask: why three narrative circles? I return to the absent fourth guest and the potential fourth narrative. Socrates, in his first words in the dialogue, counts off the number of guests in his presence and wonders where the fourth guest has gone, since he had been present the day before. Timaeus responds that the guest felt unwell and could not make today's meeting, but for no other reason would he have been absent. Cornford proposes that perhaps the fourth guest is left unnamed for practical reasons in the event that Plato wanted to add an additional dialogue to the series (1937.3). Taylor suggests that this person is left unnamed because the system Timaeus describes is Pythagorean in nature, but in its specifics, "does not agree wholly with any known Pythagorean theory" of the time. Thus it would appear that Timaeus stands in for a fourth philosopher who is intentionally unnamed because he does not exist in reality (1928.45) . In his commentary on the Timaeus, Proclus reviews the theories concerning the identity of the fourth guest, which include the hypothesis that the absent guest is Plato himself.
16 While these proposals are intriguing, I believe there is another answer.
I contend that we are not told the identity of the missing fourth guest intentionally because the fourth guest must not be present in the dialogue, and that this is a necessary condition of the structure and intention of Timaeus's account. As a human being, Timaeus is only able to generate an eikos logos, a likeness or, perhaps more accurately, a series of likenesses by meditating upon the circles of the World-Soul, and his account represents his attempt to perform this process by means of language. However, the reader must continue such meditation after Timaeus has completed his narrative. The absent fourth guest serves as a signal to readers that we must interpret the text didactically and perform this meditative process ourselves. By heeding Timaeus's words and imitating his actions, we may hope to settle our own internal disorderly motion.
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